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A Barometer of Freedom of the Press: The
Opinions of Mr. Justice White
Since the Zurcher v. Stanford Daily decision which was authored by Jus-
tice Byron F. White, the news media has become increasingly concerned
with its'first amendment protections from governmental searches. Since
Justice White has been the voice of the United States Supreme Court on
this very issue, the author submits that an examination of Justice White's
media related opinions can serve as a "barometer" for the constitutional
protections of the news media. The author examines the use of Justice
White to the Supreme Court, his staunch adherence to stare decisis, and the
historical foundation of the first amendment as they relate to the news me-
dia. The author then analyzes Justice White's media related opinions so as
to indicate that the "barometer" does not point to a liberalized, almost
privileged status of the press. Rather, the "barometer" points back to the
Founding Fathers and notes that Justice White believes the press deserves
neither more nor less constitutional protection than contemplated and af-
forded by the creators of the first amendment.
I. INTRODUCTION
The topic of the freedom of members of the press to gather in-
formation without governmental interference has seen a resur-
gence in recent years before the United States Supreme Court.'
Among the most frequently involved in authoring majority opin-
ions on this matter has been Associate Justice Byron R. White. It
is the thesis of this comment that through the examination of Mr.
Justice White's personal background and his legal opinions, one
may conclude that his views are a fair indicator of what to expect
in future first amendment decisions of the type discussed here.
This comment will also explore why Justice White holds these
opinions. For the purposes of this comment, the discussion of
press freedoms will be limited to the print media and the area
known as "newsman's privilege" or "newsgathering function." 2
1. See Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTNGS L.J. 631 (1975):
I turn this morning to an inquiry into an aspect of constitutional law that
has only recently begun to engage the attention of the Supreme Court.
Specifically I shall discuss the role of the organized press-of the daily
newspapers and other established media-in the system of government
created by our Constitution.
Id. Mr. Justice Stewart goes on to remark that it was not until the Vietnam War
that the nation became aware of investigative reporting and an adversary press,
and not until the resignation of President Nixon that the nation realized the "enor-
mous power" exerted by an investigative and adversary press. Id.
2. "Newsman's privilege" is a term used in this comment to represent the
A secondary point to be made is that, while appointed 3 by a
Democratic President, John F. Kennedy, White did not turn out to
be the "liberal" voice on the Court that some authorities origi-
nally expected. In fact, the ensuing examination of his back-
ground and opinions shows that his viewpoint is conservative
regarding press freedoms and so rooted in stare decisis as to
clearly indicate why the press holds its current legal status.
Mr. Justice White's opinions include the following propositions:
(1) reporters are not privileged in matters of offering testimony
about criminal activity;4 (2) newsroom ifies are not privileged in
criminal subpoena situations; 5 and (3) there exists no privilege
concept that reporters are privileged from certain legal processes due to the guar-
antees of the first amendment. See, e.g., Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the De-
veloping Qualified Privilege for Newsmen, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 709 (1975). The
"newsgathering function" is the mode practiced by a reporter in gathering infor-
mation for his story and is inclusive of unnamed sources and information desired
by the reporter to be kept private.
3. Mr. Justice Byron White was appointed to the United States Supreme
Court on March 30, 1962, at the age of 44. IV L. FRIEDMAN AND F. ISRAEL, THE Jus-
TICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969, at 2951 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as FRIEDMAN AND ISRAEL].
4. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). The Court combined three cases
involving reporters who refused to testify before grand juries regarding the divul-
gence of confidential information. Id. at 667. The Court held that it would not cre-
ate another "privilege against compelled self-incrimination ... by interpreting the
First Amendment to grant newsmen a testimonial privilege that other citizens do
not enjoy." Id. at 690.
Branzburg was a staff reporter for the Louisville Courier-Journal, for which he
wrote an article detailing his observations of two residents of Jefferson County,
Kentucky, synthesizing hashish from marijuana. The article stated that
Branzburg promised not to reveal the two hashish producers' identities. The Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals held that while the state law allows a claim of
nondivulgence of informants, it does not apply when testifying as to observations
of criminal acts. Id. at 669. Branzburg was called again to testify in another in-
stance when he wrote about drug usage; he presented the same argument and the
court made the same conclusion. Id. at 670.
One of the companion cases of Branzburg, In re Pappas, involved a reporter who
had been allowed inside a building taken over by the Black Panther Party during
a confrontation with police. Pappas agreed not to disclose anything he saw inside
the hide-out, except anticipation of a police raid. He limited his answers to the
court to cover only events occurring outside the building and was held in con-
tempt for refusing to testify on his observations. Id. at 675-677.
The other companion case of Branzburg, United States v. Caldwell, dealt with
the attempts by a federal grand jury to subpoena a New York Times reporter to
testify and produce notes concerning the aims, purposes and activities of the
Black Panther Party as divulged to the reporter by party officials. Reporter Cald-
well brought a motion to quash, contending that his working relationships with the
Black Panthers would be destroyed and that his first amendment rights would be
suppressed. Id. at 676. The subpoena was modified to require his appearance only
with a qualified privilege to keep his sources confidential; upon Caldwell's refusal
to testify he was found in contempt. The court of appeals reversed the contempt
order and found a qualified testimonial privilege for news reporters existed under
the first amendment. Id. at 675-679.
5. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978). The lower courts had sus-
tained the notion that for all non-suspect third parties a subpoena duces tecum
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regarding the editorial process 6 of responsible parties when the
published material is alleged to be false and damaging.7
The response to many of Justice White's opinions has been one
of indignation from both the press and politicians. 8 The factors
would be required before a search, and that in the case of newspapers, the first
amendment requires a clear showing of destruction or removal of the materials
sought and the-futility of a restraining order. Id. at 552-553.
The search of the Stanford Daily office was precipitated by the paper's publica-
tion of photographs of the student-police clash at a demonstration at Stanford Uni-
versity Hospital. Nine police officers were injured and hospital administrator's
offices were damaged. The Stanford Daily indicated in its special edition on the
demonstration that its photographer had been in an area where the assault on the
police officers could have been photographed. Id. at 550-551.
A search warrant for a search of the paper's offices was issued on a finding of
"just, probable and reasonable cause for believing that: Negatives, and photo-
graphs and films, evidence material relevant to the identity of the perpetrators of
felonies to wit, Battery on a Police Officer, and Assault and Deadly Weapon, will
be located [on the premises of the Daily] ." The paper's photographic laboratories,
filing cabinets, desks and wastepaper baskets were searched but locked drawers
and rooms were not opened. Id. at 551.
6. White alludes to the meaning of the term "editorial process" in his major-
ity opinion in Herbert v. Lando, 99 S. Ct. 1635 (1979), where it is described as
"thoughts, opinions, and conclusions with respect to the material gathered by [re-
spondent-editor Lando] and about his conversation with his editorial colleagues."
Id. at 1639 n.2, 1640.
7. Id. at 1645. Petitioner Herbert had accused his superiors in the military of
covering up reports of atrocities and war crimes during the Vietnam War. Respon-
dent Lando produced a program on petitioner's allegations, which was broadcast
by the Columbia Broadcasting System, which was later published into a related
article for Atlantic Monthly magazine. Petitioner sued for the false and malicious
portrayal and damages for injury to his reputation and to the literary value of his
newly published book on his experiences. Id. at 1638-1639.
8. The reaction to Zurcher v. Stanford Daily indicates the concern being
evoked by the seemingly restrictive holdings of the White opinions. The Los Ange-
les Times reported Zurcher as "a major setback for news organizations." L.A.
Times, June 1, 1978, § 1, at 1, col. 3. Washington Post managing editor Benjamin
Bradlee contended that the Zurcher holding would have enabled the federal gov-
ernment to forestall publication of the Pentagon Papers and harass the Washing-
ton Post's Watergate investigation by seizing materials and putting newsrooms in
a state of seige. Comment, 1978 COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. 22.
Nationally syndicated New York Times columnist James Reston wrote an open
letter to White, stating:
The troubling thing to us in the press is what may now happen as a result
of this . . . decision .... It is not really that you have said that the press
is the same as everybody else, but that you have said also that our efforts
to get at the truth, in private conversations, are subject to government in-
quiry on demand by government officials.
Cznerniejewski, Your Newsroom May be Searched, Quill, July-August 1978, 24, col.
2 [hereinafter cited as Cznerniejewski].
On the political front, several bills were proposed in the United States Congress.
Rep. Robert Drinan (D-Mass.) asked the Congress to require that news organiza-
tions be given a chance to contest a planned search unless there was probable
that have caused the White opinions to be contrary to those of
some politicians and much of the press are the subject matter of
this comment.
II. PERSONAL CREDENTIALS
Byron White was appointed to the United States Supreme
Court in 1962, after serving for almost two years as Deputy United
States Attorney General under Robert F. Kennedy. White's life
has been punctuated with various noteworthy achievements
throughout his academic, athletic and legal ventures. Accord-
ingly, the New York Times hailed his appointment by calling him
"one of those increasingly rare specimens who prove that the
Greek and Renaissance ideal of the well-rounded man has valid-
ity in the twentieth century."9
It is useful to examine the achievements, which have contrib-
uted to this Renaissance image, as they are a manifestation of
White's great determination to be the best in every traditional
sense of the word. As one will see later in this comment, White is
similarly determined to adhere to a traditional stance in his views
regarding the press. White was in fact well-rounded; he received
the following honors while an undergraduate student at the Uni-
versity of Colorado: class valedictorian, Phi Beta Kappa and All-
American football player. He went on to become a Rhodes
Scholar at Oxford University, England. White cut short his
Rhodes Scholarship to play professional football for the National
Football League, where in his first year he drew the highest
rookie salary and led the league in rushing.10 Following these ac-
complishments, he was admitted to the Yale Law School. At
Yale, White had the highest freshman grade point average and
was selected to serve on the law journal."' White turned down
the law journal and left Yale to play another season of profes-
cause to believe a member of the news outfit had committed a criminal offense.
Senators Birch Bayh (D-Ind.) and Robert Dole (R-Kan.) proposed extending such
protection to any third party involved in searches. A Justice Department spokes-
person told the press that then-Attorney General Griffin Bell had already ordered
search warrants of newsrooms to require the attorney general's approval. Cz-
nerniejewski at 25. On September 23, 1978 the California General Assembly
passed A.B. 512, subsequently signed by Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., which
required a subpoena prior to a search for evidence of a crime gathered by third
party journalists. Stats. 1978, C1054, p 3 5 86, § 1.
9. N.Y. Times, March 31, 1962, § 1, at 10, col. 4.
10. FRIEDMAN AND ISRAEL, supra note 3, at 2951, 2953. White was paid $15,000
for his first season, during which he led the league with 567 yards in rushing while
playing for the Pittsburgh Steelers. "No other rookie had ever before led the
league in any department, and White did it with the last place team." Id.
11. Id.
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sional football, 12 followed by a tour of duty as a naval intelligence
officer in the South Pacific during World War II.13
White became acquainted with John F. Kennedy whom he had
met while at Oxford; Kennedy's father was then the American
Ambassador to Great Britain. Later during World War II, it was
White who wrote the intelligence report on Naval Lt. (j.g.) Ken-
nedy's salvage of crewmembers on PT-109. Upon returning to
Yale after his military service, White was graduated magna cum
laude and awarded a judicial clerkship with United States
Supreme Court Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson.' 4 It was in Wash-
ington where White crossed paths with John F. Kennedy a third
time, as then-Congressman Kennedy had offices across the street
from the Supreme Court.1 5 After clerking for the Chief Justice,
White declined offers from Washington, D.C.'s most prestigious
firms because they could not guarantee him a law firm partner-
ship in three years, and instead moved back to Colorado where he
spent fourteen years in private practice.16
Byron R. White and John F. Kennedy were again brought to-
gether by events, after Kennedy declared himself a candidate for
President of the United States. Concluding that Kennedy was
"cool and courageous under fire [and was] . . .a pretty solid sort
of person,"' 7 White organized Colorado attorneys and Colorado's
national convention delegates for Kennedy and headed up the
Citizens for Kennedy national volunteer group.1 8
12. Id. White played the 1940-41 season with the Detroit Lions and made up
his missed Yale classes at the University of Colorado summer session. He was
convinced his legal education would be inevitably interrupted by the draft.
13. FRIEDMAN AND ISRAEL, supra note 3, at 2953. White reminisced:
It's hard to say that you had a good time in the war but, on the other hand,
you couldn't say it was dull or purposeless. It's an experience I'd just as
soon not have had but, having had it, I have to admit it was a very great
experience.
Id.
14. N.Y. Times, March 31, 1962, § 1, at 10, col. 4-8. FRIEDMAN AND ISRAEL, supra
note 3, at 2954.
15. N.Y. Times, note 14 supra.
16. FRIEDMAN AND ISRAEL, supra note 3, at 2954.
17. Id. at 2954.
18. Id. at 2954, 2955. "One day in the summer of 1959 while I was driving back
from an A.A.U. track meet in Boulder [Colorado]," recalled White, "I got to think-
ing about the coming presidential campaign.... I began to feel that Jack Ken-
nedy would be my preference." Acting upon that preference, White proceeded to
enlist a group of lawyers into a Colorado Committee for Kennedy. Id. at 2954.
Later, as an organizer of Colorado delegates attending the national convention,
White was able to deliver to Kennedy thirteen and one-half out of twenty-one Col-
III. THE WHITE STYLE
After Kennedy was elected President, he appointed White to
the position of Deputy Attorney General.19 Upon his appoint-
ment, White commented that he 'didn't get into the campaign
with the idea of getting a job."20 Indeed, through his actions
White would soon illustrate that his being a Kennedy supporter
did not mean he shared the approach or same style as the Ken-
nedys. A glimpse of his actions while at the Justice Department
serves as an examination of White's working style and as support
for the idea that his style and attitude differed. White, instead, is
seen as having a very classic legal approach as contrasted with an
informal, results-oriented approach on the part of the Kennedys;
the same schism will be shown in this comment to have formed
between White and his dissenters regarding freedom of the press.
For example, White's insistence on procedure contrasted with the
style of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy:
Edwin Siberling of the Organized Crime Section recalls sitting in on a
conference between Deputy Byron White and [Attorney General Robert]
Kennedy. After White had started to outline the technical grounds of an
issue that could go either way, Kennedy waved his hand after a couple of
minutes and said, 'Give me a yes or no.'
2 1
White was characterized by another Justice Department associate
accordingly: "I remember Whizzer22 White used to sit on the win-
dow seat with his feet up and not say very much except to bring
the discussion back to point. '23
Another example of White's differing attitude from the Ken-
orado delegate votes at the 1960 Democratic Party Convention. Id. Campaign
manager Robert Kennedy asked White to head Citizens for Kennedy after the na-
tional convention. This was a network of volunteer groups whose efforts were co-
ordinated wherever possible with the local political clubs. Id. at 2955. Robert
Kennedy was so impressed with White's work that he wanted White to be ap-
pointed chairman of the Democratic National Committee, which Presidential As-
sistant Kenneth O'Donnell termed a display of "naivete . . . that was downright
astonishing." A.M. SCHLESINGER, JR., ROBERT KENNEDY AND His TIMES 212 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as SCHLESINGER].
19. It was Robert Kennedy who asked his brother, the President-elect, to
name White as Deputy Attorney General. White was nominated to the post on
December 16, 1960. FRIEDMAN AND ISRAEL, supra note 3, at 2955.
According to Schlesinger, White was offered the choice between Secretary of the
Army, Secretary of the Air Force, or Deputy Attorney General. SCHLESINGER,
supra note 18, at 237.
20. FRIEDMAN AND ISRAEL, supra note 3, at 2955.
21. V. NAVASKY, KENNEDY JUSTICE 281 (1971) [hereinafter cited as NAVASKY].
White's replacement as Deputy Attorney General, Nicholas Katzenbach who was
later appointed as Attorney General after Robert Kennedy's resignation in 1964,
recalled that Robert Kennedy "never went through what the law was. You'd come
to him and say here's a real close one and he'd decide - but not on legal
grounds." Id.
22. N.Y. Times, note 14 supra.
23. NAVASKY, supra note 21, at 47.
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nedys was in the area of perceiving opportunities for achieve-
ment. In discussing possible appointees to replace retiring
Justice Whittaker, Robert Kennedy remarked, "Do you really
think Byron wants to go on the Court?"24 It "was not quite believ-
able to Kennedy that White would prefer a job on the U.S.
Supreme Court to the number-two job in the Justice Department
where, according to the Attorney General's way of thinking, the
real action was." 25
Byron White was directly involved with most of this real action
while at the Justice Department; perhaps he was involved to a
greater degree than most deputy attorneys general because the
Attorney General was frequently busy advising his brother the
President on various affairs of state.26 For example, Robert Ken-
nedy's Justice Department associates were told to report to White
during the Cuban missile crisis.27 Victor S. Navasky, author of a
critique on Kennedy's tenure at the Justice Department, charac-
terizes White as both a "tough-minded proceduralist" 28 and an ad-
ministrator "who had a remarkable ability for reconciling the
competing claims of the various Justice Department principali-
ties. ' 29 The White style of mixing tough proceduralism while rec-
onciling competing claims resurfaces in his opinions on the
freedom of the press, wherein he tries to reassure the press of its
preeminent freedoms while driving home his points regarding the
lack of press privilege.30
White's particular skills were applied to a number of difficult is-
sues, among them directing the force of 500 federal marshals sent
to Alabama to protect Martin Luther King during sit-in demon-
strations.3 1 Another assigned task was supervising all federal
24. Id. at 255. Katzenbach told Kennedy "I can understand why you don't
want to let Byron go," explaining later that "I knew this would offend Bobby [Ken-
nedy] but I think it was fairly instrumental in helping to persuade him." Id. Ken-
nedy's response to Katzenbach was "I'm not going to stand in Byron's way. I can
handle the Justice Department without Byron." SCHLESINGER, supra note 18, at
378.
25. NAVASKY, supra note 21, at 255; see also SCHLESINGER, supra note 18, at
378.
26. SCHLESINGER, supra note 18, at 446.
27. Id.
28. NAVASKY, supra note 21, at 54.
29. Id. at 58.
30. See notes 158-162 infra, and accompanying text.
31. SCHLESINGER, supra note 18, at 297. For details as to the Birmingham, Ala-
bama, operation, see id. at 295-303. White recalls:
There was an issue at this time in my own mind which I took up with the
judge selection, which involved directing over 1,000 investigative
reports.32 Supreme Court biographers Leon Friedman and Fred
L. Israel wrote that White's role as judge selector was perhaps his
most notable achievement while deputy attorney general;33 the
New York Times remarked that White had "been criticized for ap-
proving some Southerners whose devotion to equal rights [had]
turned out to be distinctly limited."34
White voiced his thoughts on the judicial selection process and
also on the frustrations of working at the Justice Department
which, while off the main point of this comment, serve to illumi-
nate a more complete picture of Byron White's personality. Re-
garding judicial selection, White told the American Bar
Association House of Delegates that "[tihere is nothing odious
about the preference for Democrats. Picking judges is a political
process in the best sense of those words." 35 Regarding the frus-
trations of working at the Justice Department, White once told a
colleague as he viewed the Department building, "You know, we
have about as much chance of changing that place as you and I do
of walking up to it, putting our shoulders against the building and
moving it."36 Yet White could also remark, "It's nothing to come
to an important job in government and be smart. The key is what
you spend your time on."3 7
Attorney General and that was this: The Department is, among other
things, a law enforcement agency and speaking for law and order is to
speak for a very strong position but when you mix law enforcement with
other things not necessarily related to it, you get law enforcement mixed
up with other things. I had thought that the Administration ought to lo-
cate the primary leadership in the civil rights fight outside the Depart-
ment of Justice. I thought it should be located either in the White House
or a separate agency so that initiative, aggressive action, education, per-
suasion should emanate from a different source than the Department of
Justice....
NAVASKY, supra note 21, at 161. This attitude of keeping a pure approach in speak-
ing for law and order is echoed in his law clerk's comments on Whites division of
personal morals and judicial reasoning. See notes 187-192 infra.
32. NAVASKY, supra note 21, at 254. Navasky characterizes the federal judicial
selection process under White as an "improvisatory style [which] was in marked
contrast to the more routinized approach of their Republican predecessors, who
had themselves delegated more of the judicial selection process to the ABA." Id.
33. FRIEDMAN AND ISRAEL, supra note 3, at 2955.
34. N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1972, (Magazine), at 95.
35. NAVASKY, supra note 21, at 256.
36. Id. at 48. White had addressed the remark to Ramsey Clark, who would be
appointed Attorney General under President Lyndon B. Johnson and whose fa-
ther was Supreme Court Associate Justice Tom Clark. At that time, Ramsey Clark
was the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Lands and Natural Resources
Division. Id. The frustrations of working at the Justice Department hit White in a
physical sense when early in his tenure he suffered from a duodenal ulcer. Id. at
254.
37. Id. at 439.
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When Byron White was nominated to the Supreme Court,38 an
assessment was made on what White had spent his time in order
to predict what kind of a justice he would be. One area of specu-
lation was on White's position on governmental interference with
individual activities. In 1962, the New York Times predicted that
White was to be on one side, yet a Times columnist sixteen years
later would picture White on the opposite side. The initial Times
position, in addition to its portrayal of White as having a Renais-
sance image, was that while White refused to give himself a con-
servative or liberal label,39 "a swift survey of those who knew him
well brought a consensus that he would probably wind-up more
often than not voting with those who want the court to intervene
more freely against Government restraints on the individual." 40
Yet in 1978, Times syndicated columnist James Reston charged in
an open letter to Mr. Justice White regarding White's majority
opinion in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily4 l that White had said that
the press's "efforts to get at the truth, in private conversations,
are subject to government inquiry on demand by government offi-
cials."42
Any thoughts of White reflecting the Kennedy and therefore
38. The appointment to the high court involved some clever manipulation of
the announcement time by President Kennedy in order to shed the best possible
light upon White's appointment. When the ABA was told after the fact that Presi-
dent Kennedy was going to announce White's appointment without consulting
them, although its representative had suggested White in the first place, the "Ex-
tremely Well Qualified" rating was guaranteed if the President would hold up the
announcement until the ABA committee had a chance to convene. 'The ABA had
not yet established with the Kennedys its interest in passing on nominations to
the highest court in the land, and here was an occasion to do so .. " The rating
was issued despite the fact that he was a year short of meeting the entry require-
ments of the American College of Trial Lawyers, "a presumption against him
under the ABA's rigid 'experience' requirement." Id. at 265. White was selected
as the nominee out of a distinguished field: Judge William H. Hastie, the first
black circuit court justice and a Truman appointee; Professor Paul Freund of
Harvard; California State Supreme Court Justice Roger Traynor; Illinois State
Supreme Court Justice Walter Schaefer; University of Chicago President Edward
Levi who was later United States Attorney General; Texas attorney Leon Jaworski
who was later Watergate Special Prosecutor; and then-Secretary of Labor Arthur
Goldberg who was eventually appointed by President Kennedy to the Court, and
subsequently by President Lyndon Johnson to the Ambassadorship to the United
Nations. SCHLESINGER, supra note 18, at 377. President Kennedy told Schlesinger
that "I figure that I will have several more appointments before I am through, and
I mean to support Freund, Arthur Goldberg and Bill Hastie." Id. at 378.
39. N.Y. Times, March 31, 1962, § 1, at 10 col. 7.
40. Id. at col. 6.
41. See note 4 supra.
42. Cznerniejewski, note 8 supra.
liberal ideology were dealt a severe blow by his first opinion, a
dissent delivered in Robinson v. California,43 which reportedly
"attracted wide attention because its conservative tinge ap-
proached the judicial thinking of retired Justice Whittaker."44
White disagreed from the majority holding that stated narcotics
addiction is an illness that should not be given criminal offense
designation because such a classification constituted cruel and
unusual punishment.45 Instead, White stated:
I deem this application of 'cruel and unusual punishment' so novel that I
suspect the Court was hard put to find a way to ascribe to the Framers of
the Constitution the result reached today rather than to its own notions of
ordered liberty.
4 6
Thus, the theme of "the Framers of the Constitution" was used by
White in writing his first Supreme Court opinion and would play
a recurring role in the coming decade when he wrote his opinions
regarding press freedoms.47
Another early White dissent struck upon a theme used in his
opinions on the press - that of protecting the criminal investiga-
tion process.48 In Escobedo v. Illinois,49 the majority's extension
of right to counsel to preliminary police investigations 50 was re-
jected by White because "law enforcement will be crippled and its
task made a great deal more difficult." 51
Consequently, the first opinions of Associate Justice Byron
White established a preference for conservative themes in his
opinions regarding freedom of the press. The origin of his views
on press freedom is anchored in portions of early case law regard-
ing the press, supporting a characterization of White as a tradi-
tionalist in this area. Accordingly, a discussion of this historical
foundation of freedom of the press is in order.
43. 370 U.S. 660, 685 (1962).
44. FRIEDMAN AND ISRAEL, supra note 3, at 2956. For a biography of Justice
Whittaker, who was appointed by Eisenhower, see id. at 2893-2918.
45. 370 U.S. at 685, 686.
46. Id. at 689.
47. See notes 61-69 infra.
48. See generally notes 93-102, 121-25, 131, 133 infra, and accompanying text.
49. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
50. Id. at 492.
51. Id. at 499. White continues:
When the accused has not been informed of his rights at all the Court
characteristically and properly looks very closely at the surrounding cir-
cumstances. . . . I would continue to do so. But in this case Danny Esco-
bedo knew full well that he did not have to answer and knew full well that
his lawyer had advised him not to answer.
Id. (citations omitted).
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IV. HISTORICAL FOUNDATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. Colonial Law
In dealing with the issue of freedom of the press, Mr. Justice
White set forth his view as to its origins. He has stated that free-
dom of the press, as envisioned by the Founding Fathers, was a
remedy for stifling and punishment of colonists' criticisms of the
Crown and its agents.5 2
Pre-revolutionary American history is dotted with such in-
stances of suppression of the press. In 1690, America's first news-
paper53 was suppressed by the Massachusetts government, which
declared not only that publication would be suppressed but that
no future publications could be set forth by anyone without first
obtaining a license or governmental appointment.54 Speech and
press were traditionally subject to controls in England, where
"[a] s early as 1275, English law prevented the telling of 'any false
news or tales whereby discord or occasion of discord or slander
may grow between the king and his people or the great men of
the realm.' "55 In 1692, a conviction in Philadelphia for "Publish-
ing, Uttering, & Spreading a Malitious [sic] and Seditious paper
• . . Tending to the Disturbance of the Peace and Subversion of
the present Government" was the first time that the use of a jury
in libel cases was advocated on the grounds that it was required
by the Magna Charta.5 6
In Massachusetts in the early 1720s, James Franklin published
the first paper to survive in America without official sanction.5 7
The paper led the first newspaper crusade in American history,
and for his efforts James Franklin was twice thrown into prison
52. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 259. "[A] major purpose
of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs....
Thus the press serves and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any
abuse of power by governmental officials. Id. at 260 (citing Mills v. Alabama,
384 U.S. 214, 218-219 (1966)).
53. Publick Occurrences, Both Foreign and Domestick was the title of
America's first newspaper. Kahane, Colonial Origins of Our Free Press, 62
A.B.A.J. 202, 203 (1976).
54. Id. at 203.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 203-204.
57. This paper was entitled The New England Courant, in which James Frank-
lin's brother Benjamin published his "Silence Dogood" essays. The elder Franklin
was jailed for failing to divulge the name of the author of a comment on the gov-
ernment's efforts to fight piracy and escaped an arrest warrant for a second con-
tempt charge. Id. at 204.
for refusal to identify sources.5 8 Perhaps the most well-known of
the colonial press was that of Peter Zenger, who as publisher of
America's first opposition party newspaper, surprised many be-
cause he was acquitted after prominent attorney Andrew Hamil-
ton argued that a libel was not actionable if true.59
After the revolution, the principles brought out in the libel case
of Peter Zenger were slowly adopted state by state, but the first
amendment neither repealed seditious libel charges nor applied
to the states until 1925.60
Justice White's dissent in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. points out
that ten of the fourteen states ratifying the Constitution by 1792
provided constitutional guarantees for free expression, but that
thirteen of the fourteen also provided for the prosecution of li-
bels.61 White also remarked that the fact that there was sharp
curtailment of freedom of the press in colonial America is
"[c] ontrary to some popular notions." 62 Convinced that Gertz is
illustrative of a weakening of the colonial laws on libel, White as-
serts that "[s]cant, if any, evidence exists that the First Amend-
ment was intended to abolish the common law of libel .... ,,63
Variations on the theme of viewing the Founding Fathers as pro-
moters of restricted press freedoms exist in several cases. In
Zurcher, Justice White states that contrary to assertions of privi-
lege by press interests, the Framers did not forbid warrants or re-
quire subpoenas where the press was concerned; neither did they
insist on special treatment of the owner of searched premises if
he was a member of the press.64 White's majority opinion in Her-
bert v. Lando65 reiterates that the framers had no intention of
abolishing defamation liability.66
58. Id.
59. The New-York Weekly Journal was the paper printed by Zenger, and it
was only two months old when the colonial governor had Zenger arrested after
failing twice to get grand jury indictments. The paper was published while Zenger
spent eight months in jail, and he "never revealed the names of his editors, writ-
ers, or sources." Id. at 205.
60. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). This case used the fourteenth
amendment through "selective incorporation" to apply the first amendment to the
states as well as the federal government.
61. 418 U.S. 323, 380-81. (1974).
62. Id. at 381. See generally L LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF
SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY (1960).
63. 418 U.S. at 381.
64. 436 U.S. at 565. "Aware of the long struggle between the Crown and the
press and desiring to curb unjustified official intrusions, the Framers took the
enormously important step of subjecting searches to the test of reasonableness
and to the general rule requiring search warrants issued by neutral magistrates."
Id.
65. See notes 6 and 7 supra.
66. 99 S. Ct. at 1640.
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In Gertz, Justice White promotes the Blackstone formula pre-
serving free speech: protection is limited to prevention of prior
restraint, with publisher liability allowed for injurious publica-
tion.67 He cites specific Founding Fathers' preferences: Benjamin
Franklin and John Adams favored limiting freedom of the press to
truthful statements; James Wilson suggested a restatement of the
Blackstone standard; Thomas Jefferson wanted to allow anything
but falsity injuriously affecting the life, liberty or reputation of
others.6 8 Thus, White is contending that modern differences from
common law stand not to preserve freedom of the press as its
function grows more complex, but rather that they weaken our
entire system of justice through creating a privileged class where
none was meant to exist.69
B. Modern Development of Newsman's Privilege
The present-day area of discussion involving freedom of the
press differs from the areas covered by common-law, namely,
newsman's privilege. In the Branzburg v. Hayes7O majority opin-
ion, White relies again on the common law to show that there is
no history of newsman's privilege.71 Accordingly, there is Justice
White on one side arguing that any area not covered by the com-
mon law cases does not follow under the purview of freedom of
the press; on the other side there is the argument that since the
Framers and early cases did not deal with new areas, it is there-
fore necessary to have these new areas covered by the first
amendment as a logical extension of its protections. Examples of
this legal struggle are contained in the documentation of news-
man's privilege cases in the lower courts preceding the relevant
opinions of Mr. Justice White.
The first amendment's protection against compelling testimony
from the press 7 2 was not even an issue in reported cases until the
67. 418 U.S. at 381 n. 14. "Prior restraint" refers to preventing publication or
restraining the publisher prior to publication. White's usage of common law in
Gertz implies "injurious publication" to be such things as defamation or obscen-
ity. Id. at 381-383.
68. Id. at 383-384.
69. "The First Amendment was intended to guarantee free expression, not to
create a privileged industry." Id. at 399 (citing Commission on Freedom of the
Press, A Free and Responsible Press. 130, 181 (1947)).
70. Note 4 supra.
71. Id. at 685-686.
72. Descriptions of the role of the press are found in Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S.
444, 450 (1938), where the Court states "[tIhe press in its historic connotation com-
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided Garland v. Torre
in 1958.73 In Garland, a newspaper columnist was cited for con-
tempt in a libel suit for refusing to name her source for unat-
tributed, published statements.7 4  In subsequent state court
opinions, the concept of newsman's privilege was repeatedly re-
jected by the courts; in several of these cases the United States
Supreme Court also denied certiorari. 75 From the Hawaii
Supreme Court, In re Goodfader's Appeal7 6 held that a news-
man's refusal to reveal a source was outweighed by the need to
obtain relevant evidence.7 7 From the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, In re Taylor 78 held that the first amendment contains no
privilege of non-disclosure to prevent complying with a grand jury
subpoena duces tecum. 79 The Oregon high court, in State v.
Buchanan,80 held that a campus newspaper reporter was in con-
tempt for not divulging the identities of students interviewed re-
garding marijuana usage.8 1 In State v. Knops,82 the Wisconsin
high court held that an underground newspaper reporter's claim
of privilege regarding sources knowledgeable about campus
crimes was outweighed by the public's overriding need to know
the identity of criminals at large.83
prehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opin-
ion," id. at 452, and Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), where the Court states
"[t] he informative function asserted by representatives of the organized press in
the present cases is also performed by lecturers, political pollsters, novelists, aca-
demic researchers, and dramatists." Id. at 705.
73. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958). The suit was
brought by entertainer Judy Garland for the publication of unkind remarks attrib-
uted to an unnamed network executive by columnist Marie Torre in the New York
Herald Tribune.
74. 259 F.2d at 547, 551.
75. Certiorari was denied in both Garland, see note 73 supra, and in State v.
Buchanan, see note 80 infra.
76. 45 Haw. 317, 367 P.2d 472 (1961).
77. Id. at 344, 367 P.2d at 487. The public employee was suing three civil serv-
ice commissioners for reinstatement to her position as the commission's personnel
director. Her allegation was supported by testimony of Goodfader, a reporter. The
dismissal was deemed wrongful and based on improper motives.
78. 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963).
79. Id. at 39, 193 A.2d at 184, 186. The Philadelphia Bulletin had printed the
name of the source of a story purporting to reveal the substance of a grand jury
investigation. The grand jury ordered the Bulletin to produce the documents sub-
ject to a subpoena duces tecum, and the Bulletin responded with a first amend-
ment privilege argument. While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not agree
with the first amendment interpretation, it held that a state statute creating a priv-
ilege of non-disclosure applied.
80. 250 Or. 244, 436 P.2d 729 (1968), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968).
81. Id. at 251, 436 P.2d at 732. "Freedom of the press is a right which belongs to
the public, it is not the private reserve of those who possess the implements of
publishing." Id. at 248, 436 P.2d at 731.
82. 49 Wis.2d 647, 183 N.W.2d 93 (1971).
83. Id. at 659, 183 N.W.2d at 99. The article was entitled The Bombers Tell Why
and What Next - Exclusive to Kaleidoscope, and printed on the front page.
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The issue of newsman's privilege finally reached the United
States Supreme Court in 1972, when Mr. Justice White's
Branzburg opinion ruled on whether the first amendment pro-
tects newsmen from testifying about their confidential sources
and information. 84 Combining three cases involving reporters
who refused to testify before grand juries regarding the divul-
gance of confidential information,8 5 White wrote for the majority
that the Court would not create another "privilege against com-
pelled self-incrimination ... by interpeting the First Amendment
to grant newsmen a testimonial privilege that other citizens do
not enjoy."8 6
Thus, in the first amendment cases from Garland through
Branzburg, the idea of an absolute privilege vested in members of
the press had been rejected. 87
V. THE WHITE OPINIONS: A SURVEY
In New York Times v. United States,88 White wrote a concurring
opinion to the majority's per curiam ruling that the United States
had not met the burden of proof for showing justification of en-
forcing a prior restraint of publishing classified material in the
New York Times and the Washington Post.89 White agreed that
the danger of allowing prior restraint was that a sweeping poten-
tial for limiting publication would be created, this potential being
contradictory to the extraordinary protection against prior re-
straints granted by our constitutional system.90 However, White
noted that the first amendment would not prevent prior restraint
of publishing government plans or operations in all circum-
stances.9 1 He drew an analogy by noting that if "the Government
Knops testified that he had some information, but that he did not have to divulge
it on the basis of the first amendment. Id. at 649, 183 N.W.2d at 94.
84. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
85. Id. at 667.
86. Id. at 690.
87. But see id. at 714 (dissenting opinion; Douglas, J.). Mr. Justice Douglas fa-
vored the absolute privilege of the press, "regardless of how suspect or strange
[individual opinions and beliefs] may appear to others." Id.
88. 403 U.S. 713 (1971). This case is better known as the Pentagon Papers case,
in which the United States had brought suit to enjoin publication of what it con-
sidered to be classified material in the New York Times and Washington Post.
89. Id. at 714.
90. Id. at 730-732.
91. Id. at 731, n. 1 (National Labor Relations Board powers, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c),
and Federal Trade Commission powers, 15 U.S.C. § 45(b), allow the imposition of
"cease and desist" orders having the effect of prior restraint).
mistakenly chose to proceed by injunction," it would not neces-
sarily prevent obtaining a criminal conviction.92
White's most lengthy, detailed and revealing majority opinion
addressing freedom of the press is in Branzburg v. Hayes.93 He
wrote that requiring newsmen to appear and testify before grand
juries does not abridge the first amendment guarantee of freedom
of speech and press. 94 White asserted that the obligation to an-
swer grand jury subpoenas was of such paramount importance so
as to make restriction of the press a non-issue.9 He observed
that the lack of newsmen's privilege from appearing before grand
juries did not create an intrusion upon press freedoms, or consti-
tute a command as to what to publish.96 Thus, White rejected the
claim that the need to keep the function of newsgathering unbur-
dened should out-weigh the interest of a grand jury in obtaining
information not disclosed by reporters.97 The press, White de-
clared, is like any other citizen who had an obligation to answer
such subpoenas.98 He found the traditional investigatory role of
the grand jury to require press compliance with subpoena or-
ders,99 and he found the claims of the press without merit,oo and
unsupported by precedent. 101 White again used his method of
92. Id. at 736-737.
93. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
94. Id. at 708.
95. Id. at 682.
96. Id. at 681, 682. "The use of confidential sources by the press is not forbid-
den or restricted; reporters remain free to seek news from any source by means
within the law. No attempt is made to require the press to publish its sources of
information or indiscriminately to disclose them on request." Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 690-691. See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 702 (1974).
99. 408 U.S. at 686-687. "[Tlhe ancient role of the grand jury ... has the dual
function of determining if there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been
committed and of protecting citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions."
Id.
100. Id. at 702-704. "If newsmen's confidential sources are as sensitive as they
are claimed to be, the prospect of being unmasked whenever a judge determines
the situation justifies it is hardly a satisfactory approach to the problem." Id. at
702. Justice White continues that the destination of such a journey is uncertain,
and the administration of newsman's privilege would present "practical and con-
ceptual difficulties of a high order." Id. at 703, 704. White also stated that the fre-
quency of informant deterrence due to grand jury testimony by newsmen is
"unclear," and
evidence fails to demonstrate . . . significant constriction of the flow of
news . . . . Evidence of the inhibiting effect of such subpoenas ... are
speculative . . . . [W]e cannot accept the argument that the public inter-
est in possible future news about crime from undisclosed, unverified
sources must take precedence over the public interest in pursuing and
prosecuting those crimes reported to the press by informants and in thus
deterring the commission of such crimes in the future.
Id. at 693-695.
101. Id. at 685-687.
It is thus not surprising that the great weight of authority is that newsmen
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traditionalism to justify opposition to the claims of those support-
ive of newsman's privilege.
In 1974, White wrote a concurring opinion in Miami Herald Pub-
lishing Co. v. Tornillo0 2 and a dissenting opinion in Gertz v. Rob-
ert Welch, Inc.10 3 Although Miami Herald was decided before
Gertz, Gertz shall be discussed first as its outcome has a direct
correlation to White's Miami Herald opinion.
The Gertz majority opinion instigated White's lengthiest and
most forcefully argued dissent regarding rights of the media. The
Gertz majority held the states could set higher standards of proof
for defamation of private persons, and neither compensation
could be allowed unless actual injury was shown nor could puni-
tive damages be allowed unless knowledge of falsity of reckless
disregard of the truth was shown.104 For thirty-five pages, White
decries the creation of standards beyond mere causation of ha-
tred, contempt and ridicule in order to allow for compensation of
private individuals in defamation cases.'0 5 For support, White
cited precedent dating back to the "very founding of our na-
tion,"' 0 6 Blackstone and the Founding Fathers,107 New York Times
are not exempt from the normal duty of appearing before a grand jury and
answering questions relevant to a criminal investigation. At common law,
courts consistently refused to recognize the existence of any privilege au-
thorizing a newsman to refuse to reveal confidential information to a
grand jury. See, e.g., Ex parte Lawrence, 116 Cal. 298, 48 P. 124 (1897);
Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 70 S.E. 781 (1911); Clein v. State, 52 So.2d
117 (Fla. 1950); In re Grunow, 84 N.J.L. 235, 85 A. 1011 (1913); People ex rel.
Mooney v. Sheriff, 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415 (1936); Joslyn v. People, 67
Colo. 297, 184 P. 375 (1919); Adams v. Associated Press, 46 F.R.D. 416
(Mass. 1957).
Id. The first time an argument regarding newsman's privilege to refuse a sub-
poena for confidential information was presented (and was rejected) was in Gar-
land v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958). See note 73
supra.
102. 418 U.S. 241 (1974). Appellee Tornillo sought to have his replies to editori-
als critical of his candidacy printed, based on an argument asserting a right to
equal time pursuant to Florida law.
103. 418 U.S. 323, 369 (1974). See notes 61-63, 68, 69 supra. Petitioner sued re-
spondent for defamation for carrying articles in a John Birch Society magazine
which stated that petitioner's representation of the family of the decedent who
was killed by a police officer was a Communist inspired frame-up of the officer. Id.
at 325-326.
104. Id. at 348-350.
105. See id. at 369-370.
106. Id. at 369.
107. Id. at 381-383. White states that while Founding Fathers Benjamin Frank-
lin, John Adams, William Cushing, James Wilson and Thomas Jefferson did not
hold identical views on freedom of the press; none favored an absolute and privi-
leged status. Id.
v. Sullivan,108 opinions of the famed first amendment absolutist
Mr. Justice William 0. Douglas,109 the vigor and robustness of the
press," 0 and his own belief that the majority "points to absolutely
no empirical evidence to substantiate its premise.""'
Miami Herald held a Florida "right of reply" statute which
granted political candidates equal and free space to answer edito-
rial criticisms unconstitutional." 2 White uses his concurring
opinion to point out where he draws the line in protection of me-
dia interests. While he finds the Miami Herald majority to be cor-
rect in its holding that newspapers cannot be forced to print
answers to his criticisms of politicians, he would not go so far as
to approve the Gertz majority's raising of the standards of proof
for defamation of private persons."13 In this context, White re-
marked:
The press is the servant, not the master, of the citizenry, and its freedom
does not carry with it an unrestricted hunting license to prey on the ordi-
nary citizen. . . . To me it is a near absurdity . . . to leave the people at
the complete mercy of the press . . . when the press . . . is steadily be-
coming more powerful and much less likely to be deterred by threats of
libel suits. 1 1
4
White had the opportunity to reiterate his opposition to Gertz
in his dissent in Time, Inc. v. Firestone.1 5 Firestone was another
defamation case, which held that respondent was not a public
figure and thus should fall under the Gertz rather than New York
Times v. Sullivan 1 6 standard. White argued that the lower court
award of compensation for defamation should be upheld because
108. Id. at 387.
109. Id. at 387. Justice White quotes Justice Douglas as stating, "Simply put,
the First Amendment did not confer a license to defame the citizen," id., and that
our "system cannot flourish if regimentation takes hold." Id. at 387, 402 (citing
Public Util. Comm'n. v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451, 469 (1952) (dissenting opinion; Doug-
las, J.)).
110. Id. at 390-391.
I doubt that jurisprudential resistance to liability without fault is sufficient
ground for employing the first amendment to revolutionize the law of li-
bel, and in my view, that body of legal rules poses no realistic threat to the
press and its service to the public. The press today is vigorous and robust.
To me, it is quite incredible to suggest that threats of libel suits from pri-
vate citizens are causing the press to refrain from publishing the truth.
Id. at 390.
111. Id. at 397.
112. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258. The Court held
"The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limi-
tations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and
public officials ... constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment." Id.
113. Id. at 262.
114. Id. at 263.
115. 424 U.S. 447 (1976). Respondent Mrs. Firestone brought suit for defamation
against petitioner Time, Inc., because Time alleged Mrs. Firestone was being di-
vorced on grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery. Id. at 449-452.
116. Id. at 461-464.
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it predated the Gertz requirement of proof of injury." 7 Further,
White stated that the Gertz rationale of excusing innocent false-
hood so as to protect "speech that matters" was not applicable
here. 118 The application of the Gertz standards, White stated, will
not further first amendment values in any way.119 Thus, we see a
common thread of reasoning in Gertz, Miami Herald and Fire-
stone: White believed that the real first amendment issues, as
based on the common law viewpoint on defamation, were being
injured by the creation of new defamation standards which seek
to give further protection to the press. The emerging picture of
White's concept of the first amendment was a preservation of co-
lonial remedies not to be tampered with, rather than a protective
standard which could be more specifically delineated whenever
times dictate new or more complex dangers facing the function of
newsgathering.
Speaking again for the majority in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,120
White declared that where a newspaper office is believed to house
photographs of persons suspected of committing criminal acts,
the non-suspect status of a newspaper office does not prevent it
from being searched for the photographs as seizable evidence via
a warrant issued upon probable cause. 12 1 In Zurcher, White dis-
missed the notion of it being a first amendment case, instead stat-
ing the issue to be "how the Fourth Amendment is to be
construed and applied to the third party search."122 He stated
that the element of probable cause, rather than the fact that the
affected party was a newspaper, was the critical factor in the
search of the Stanford Daily offices. 123 White only considers the
117. Id. at 482-483. 'Therefore, to require proof of fault in this case-or in any
other case predating Gertz and Rosenbloom in which a private figure is defamed-
is to interfere with the State's otherwise legitimate policy of compensating defa-
mation victims without furthering First Amendment goals in any way at all (em-
phasis in original)." Id. at 483.
118. Id. at 482. "Speech that matters" is a term taken from the Gertz majority
which stated "[t]he First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in
order to protect speech that matters." 418 U.S. at 341.
119. Id. at 481, 483.
120. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
121. Id. at 563, 567. "[W]e decline to reinterpret the Amendment to impose a
general constitutional barrier against warrants to search newspaper premises, to
require resort to subpoenas as a general rule, or to demand prior notice and hear-
ing in connection with the issuance of search warrants." Id. at 567.
122. Id. at 553.
123. Id. at 554-555.
[I]n criminal investigations, a warrant to search for recoverable items is
first amendment in the context of clearly seeing the warrant for
newsroom materials to be nonthreatening to first amendment
freedoms, thus allowing him to view it as a pure search and
seizure case. This position parallels another part of his Zurcher
opinion, which in essence declares that compelling a reporter's
compliance with a grand jury subpoena also poses no threat.
"Prior cases," White states, "do no more than insist that the
courts apply the warrant requirements with particular exactitude
when First Amendment interests would be endangered by the
search."124 White is thus unwilling to go beyond this acknowl-
edgement to label the media a privileged class.
Finally, Justice White's most recent media-oriented majority
opinion was in Herbert v. Lando.125 In Herbert, White's opinion
stated that a plaintiff could inquire into the editorial processes of
those responsible for a publication allegedly circulating damaging
falsehoods, when the inquiry would produce evidence material to
the proof of a critical element of one's cause of action. 126 White
stated that previous defamation cases were conditioned upon
"specified showing of culpable conduct by those who publish
damaging falsehood," and that "[g]iven the required proof [] ...
damages liability for defamation abridges neither freedom of
speech nor freedom of the press." 127 In fact, White stated, the
very requirement of showing malice requires an examination of
the editorial process and this examination is justified by common
law before New York Times v. Sullivan as well as beyond. 128
However, White once again reached into common law to justify
his position. But unlike previous opinions when invoking com-
mon law was used as a basis for resisting any further expansion
of press freedoms and protections, White's claim in Herbert was
that the common law allowed him to define the "examination of
the editorial process" standard. White once again rejected the
claim that his holding would threaten the suppression of informa-
tion by stating that truthful information would not be threatened
reasonable 'only when there is "probable cause" to believe that they will
be uncovered in a particular dwelling.' Search warrants are not directed
at persons; they authorize the search of "place[s] and seizure of things,"
and as a constitutional matter they need not even name the person from
whom the things will be seized.
Id. at 555 (citing United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 155 n. 15 (1974)).
124. Id. at 565.
125. 99 S. Ct. 1635 (1979); see notes 6 and 7 supra, and accompanying text.
126. Id. at 1641-1642. "It is ... untenable to conclude from our cases that ...
plaintiffs may not inquire directly from the defendants whether they knew or had
reason to suspect that their damaging publication was in error." Id. In the com-
mon law, "a showing of malice on the part of the defendant permitted plaintiffs to
recover punitive or enhanced damages." Id.
127. Id. at 1640-1641.
128. Id. at 1641-1642.
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when the examination was for the purposes of proving the neces-
sary awareness of probable falsehood.129 The common thread in
Zurcher and Herbert was White's desire to promote proper proce-
dure. This was evidenced by White's justifying the Zurcher hold-
ing on fourth amendment grounds and the Herbert holding with
his common law perception of defamation standards.
VI. RECURRING THEMES
A. The Balancing with Classic Legal Concepts
A noteworthy consistency in White's opinions is that when he
has defined the role of the press in terms of obligation to the pub-
lic interest, he then discusses a balancing between press and a
variety of classic legal concepts. Most frequently, his historically
based analysis lends itself to the conclusion that the classic legal
concepts prevail over his perception of the claims of the press.
This observation is evidenced by the sustaining of the "ancient
role of the grand jury" in Branzburg,130 the sustaining of "the av-
erage citizen's chance for vindication" in Miami Herald,3 1 the de-
fending of the "classic view" of defamation in Gertz,132 the
sustaining of the search warrant as an essential tool of criminal
investigation in Zurcher,133 and the preserving of the individual's
129. Id. at 1648.
This is not to say that the editorial discussions or exchanges have no con-
stitutional protection from casual inquiry. There is no law that subjects
the editorial process to private or official examination merely to satisfy cu-
riosity or to serve some general end such as the public interest; and if
there were, it would not survive constitutional scrutiny as the First
Amendment is presently construed.
Id.
130. 408 U.S. 665, 687 n.23, 688 (1972).
131. 418 U.S. 323, 361-62 (1974).
132. Id. at 384.
This Court in bygone years has repeatedly dealt with libel and slander ac-
tions from the District of Columbia and from the Territories. Although in
these cases First Amendment considerations were not expressly dis-
cussed, the opinions of the Court unmistakably revealed that the classic
law of libel was firmly in place where federal law controlled.
Id. See, e.g., Washington Post Co. v. Chaloner, 250 U.S. 290 (1919); Baker v.
Warner, 231 U.S. 588 (1913); Nalle v. Oyster, 230 U.S. 165 (1913); Door v. United
States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Pollard v. Lyon, 91 U.S. 225 (1875); White v. Nicholls, 44
U.S. (3 How.) 266 (1845).
133. 436 U.S. 547, 559-560 (1978). White states that those free of criminal in-
volvement should be allowed to be searched to "recover evidence of a crime not
committed by them but committed by others," since a search could be conducted
under civil statutes. Id. at 559. "As we understand the structure and language of
the Fourth Amendment and our cases expounding it, valid warrants to search
interest in protecting one's reputation in Herbert.134
In each case, White aligns, defines and restricts the issues into
a setting where the particular first amendment issue is replaced
by the concept of a reporter as an individual outside the amend-
ment's scope, who should not expect to prevail against firmly en-
trenched legal principles.
B. The Obligations of All Persons
In furthering his notion of the balanced press privilege, White
reveals his bottomline reasoning: the press is collectively under
the same obligations required of all Americans, seemingly making
the role of the ordinary person paramount. Thus, as other citi-
zens must answer grand jury subpoenas, so must the press. 3 5
The general public is denied special access to passport informa-
tion, grand juries, executive sessions and private organizations, so
is the press. 3 6 The public cannot be not exempt from being sub-
jected to warrants, cannot require special subpoenas and cannot
insist upon showing a property owner's implication in a crime
before allowing a search; neither can the press.137
C. The Power of the Press
Coinciding with White's view of members of the press as ordi-
nary citizens is his view that the press has enough power without
giving it privileged status. What White views as the real threat is
not that of press inhibition, but rather its distortion. The press,
White says, is vigorous and robust 3 8 and will continue to flour-
ish.139 He sees the communications industry as powerful' 40 and
not easily intimidated.141 White sees danger in the creation of an
imbalance in the communications process.142 In Branzburg,
White writes that the advocacy of liberalized press freedoms has
the potential of being misguided;143 the goal is not to create a
property may be issued when it is satisfactorily demonstrated to the magistrate
that fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of crime is located on the premises."
Id.
134. 99 S. Ct. at 1646.
135. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682, 685 (1972).
136. Id. at 684-685.
137. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 565.
138. Gertz, v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 390.
139. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 698-699.
140. 418 U.S. at 390-391.
141. Id. at 391. See also 436 U.S. at 566.
142. 418 U.S. at 400.
143. 408 U.S. at 692-693. White characterizes the view of the press as being "it is
better to write about crime than to do something about it," thus dismissing the
claim of privilege as insubstantial and one "we cannot seriously entertain." Id.
As to the argument of diminishing the flow of news by requiring reporters to tes-
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"privileged industry."'44 In Herbert, White voices the fear that
once internal communications within the editorial process are im-
munized, there is only the possibility of further immunization
outside the editorial process. 45 Taking such a misguided direc-
tion, he contends, would result in the conditions decried in his
Gertz dissent: "yielding to the apparently irresistable impulse to
announce a new and different interpretation of the First Amend-
ment."146
Accordingly, White states that "the First Amendment does not
invalidate every incidental burdening of the press that may result
from the enforcement of civil or criminal statutes of general appli-
cability."'147 White is once again distinguishing between the con-
cept of the first amendment as a protective device and the
concept of the first amendment as creator of a privileged class.
White does not see the powers of the press as privileged; they are
not raised to the same level of importance as those of the public
interest. "[Llaws serving substantial public interests," White
states, "may be enforced against the press as against others, de-
spite the possible burden that may be imposed."'148 Thus, the
goals of the press and the public interest are not, in White's mind,
always synonymous.
D. Skepticism Toward Press Fears
Justice White repeatedly meets claims of privilege with skepti-
cism, in addition to his reliance on precedent. In Branzburg, he
states:
the evidence fails to demonstrate that there would be a significant con-
tify, White agrees that such an argument may not be irrational, but that it has not
been demonstrated that the argument is significant in the light of reaffirming com-
mon law principles. Id.
144. 418 U.S. at 399 (citing Commission on Freedom of the Press, A Free and
Responsible Press 130, 181 (1947)).
145. 99 S. Ct. at 1646:
It is worth noting here that the privilege as asserted by respondents
would also immunize from inquiry the internal communications occurring
during the editorial process and thus place beyond reach what the defend-
ant participants learned or knew as the result of such collegiate conversa-
tions or exchanges. If damaging admissions to colleagues are to be barred
from evidence, would a reporter's admissions made to third parties not
participating in the editorial process also be immune from inquiry?
Id. See notes 6 and 7 supra.
146. 418 U.S. at 380.
147. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 682.
148. Id. at 682-683.
striction of the flow of news to the public if this Court reaffirms the prior
common-law and constitutional rule regarding the testimonial obligations.
of newsmen. Estimates of the inhibiting effect of such subpoenas on the
willingness of informants to make disclosures to newsmen are widely di-
vergent and to a real extent speculative.
1 49
In Gertz, he remarks that Court decisions forcing self-censor-
ship do not inhibit the editorial process, but rather that self-cen-
sorship is a welcomed by-product when dealing with potentially
defamatory material.150 Similarly, he states in Herbert that any
precautionary measures before publication would be both posi-
tive and desired.' 5 ' The skepticism theme is carried more
strongly in Zurcher, as White is not convinced that the lack of re-
porter's privilege will cause news sources to disappear, 5 2 or that
his decision will bring more than "incremental effects" which
make no constitutional difference. 5 3 In Herbert, White sees no
threat from his decision in the form of suppression of truthful in-
formation. 154 Nonetheless, White concedes in Time, Inc. v. Fire-
stone that unless innocent falsehood is allowed, some true speech
will also be deterred. 5 5 This, however, is not a concession to the
fears of the press, for as a promoter of traditional common law, he
has stated that the original defamation standard was more than a
showing of mere falsity, but is also a requirement for one to show
causation of hatred, contempt and ridicule.156
E. Reassuring the Press
It has been shown here that the basis for all of Mr. Justice
White's recurring themes is a belief in prior policy rather than ac-
149. Id. at 693.
150. 418 U.S. at 396. "It is difficult to understand what is constitutionally wrong
with assessing punitive damages to deter a publisher from departing from those
standards of care ordinarily followed in the publishing industry, particularly if
common-law malice is also shown." Id.
151. 99 S. Ct. at 1647-1648. White states that the fear of dampening "frank dis-
cussion among reporters and editors" if such discussion is subject to inquiry is un-
founded, because "the press has an obvious interest in avoiding the infliction of
harm by the publication of false information." White continues:
[IJt is not unreasonable to expect the media to invoke whatever proce-
dures that may be practicable and useful to that end. Moreover, given ex-
posure to liability when there is knowing or reckless error, there is even
more reason to resort to prepublication precautions, such as a frank in-
terchange of fact and opinion.
Id. at 1648. See notes 6 and 7 supra.
152. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 566.
153. Id.
154. 99 S. Ct. at 1647.
155. 424 U.S. at 482. This remark portrays White's reasoning as to why previous
cases have required some degree of fault to exist before defamation can be shown
and is the foundation for the "speech that matters" term used in Gertz, 418 U.S. at
341.
156. 418 U.S. at 369, 370.
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tivist posture in viewing the first amendment. As shown by his
skeptical attitude towards press fears and his viewpoint toward
press powers, White believes that the press has nothing to fear
from his traditionalist method of applying the first amendment.
Accordingly, White's opinions eventually enter into a section de-
voted to reassuring the press. In effect, he tells the press that his
opinions do not really endanger basic first amendment freedoms
as he sees them. He sees the press as having vast protection
which can be summarized as follows: New York Times 157 gave a
grant of extraordinary protection; Miami Herald5 8 struck down
the "right of reply" statute and expressed court skepticisms of
measures allowing the government to inject itself into the edito-
rial rooms;159 Gertz160 refused to reject the essentiality of a free
press; and Zurcher16' gave a standard of "scrupulous exactitude"
when materials protected by the first amendment are subject to
search and seizure.
VII. THE DIRECTION OF THE COURT AND THE PRESS
The opinions of Mr. Justice White, as discussed, clearly evi-
dence a traditionalist slant. But there are those who take issue
with White's approach and first among them are White's brethren
on the Court. The late former Associate Justice William 0. Doug-
las was known as a strong advocate of press freedoms to the de-
gree of viewing the first amendment as an absolute protection
that would award the privileges so far refused by the Court. 62
White argues that the first amendment was based not on privilege
but on the right to speak out;' 63 Justice Douglas contended that
the first amendment's effect was to create a protection of the me-
dia. For example, Douglas wrote a strongly worded dissent to
White's majority opinion in Branzburg which gives one a clear
understanding of his position:
157. 403 U.S. at 730.
158. 418 U.S. at 259.
159. Id.
160. 418 U.S. at 398.
161. 436 U.S. at 566.
162. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 713 (dissenting opinion; Douglas,
J.): "[TIhe . . . position that First Amendment rights are to be balanced against
other needs or conveniences of government [is amazing] .... My belief is that
all of the "balancing" was done by those who wrote the Bill of Rights (footnotes
omitted)." Id.
163. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 259-262. See note 52
supra.
Two principles which follow from this understanding of the First Amend-
ment are at stake here. One is that the people, the ultimate governors,
must have absolute freedom of, and therefore privacy of, their individual
opinions and beliefs regardless of how suspect or strange they may ap-
pear to others. Ancillary to that principle is the conclusion that an indi-
vidual must also have absolute privacy over whatever information he may
generate in the course of testing his opinions and beliefs. 16 4
Douglas countered another White opinion, Red Lion Broadcasting
Co., v. Federal Communications Commission165 in an address in
late 1974.166 Red Lion, Douglas said, has placed radio and televi-
sion "into harness" in an effort to "heat the media... as public
utilities ... [with the idea being] to make them available to all so
that every facet of current problems and events may be
presented."167 The rule of fair comment and prior restraints,
Douglas stated, is only a forerunner of censorship.168 Rather than
using the approach of calling for governmental regulation to pro-
mote fairness in voicing opposing views, Douglas claimed that the
right of various media owners, "be they conservative, reactionary
or ignorant," promises independence for any opposed school of
thought.169 He concludes that "if Big Brother in Washington,
D.C., got his hands on the controls," the wide spectrum of ideas to
be expected from media independence would not be presented. 7 0
Associate Justice Potter Stewart, educated at Yale at the same
time as White,171 also wrote a strongly worded dissent to White's
majority opinion in Branzburg.
The court's crabbed view of the First Amendment reflects a disturbing in-
sensitivity to the critical role of an independent press in our society. The
question whether a reporter has a constitutional right to a confidential re-
lationship with his source is of first impression here, but the principles
that should guide our decision are as basic as any to be found in the Con-
stitution ... [TIhe Court in these cases holds that a newsman has no
First Amendment right to protect his sources when called before a grand
164. 408 U.S. at 714 (dissenting opinion; Douglas, J.).
165. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). White wrote the majority opinion which held that the
Federal Communications Commission "fairness doctrine" of requiring the fair
presentation of each side of public issues was not violative of the first amendment
freedoms of press and speech, being an implementation of congressional intent
and enforcement of public interest above media selectivity. Id. at 369, 378-379, 385.
The case centered on a 15 minute broadcast on WGCB, a Pennsylvania radio sta-
tion owned by Red Lion Broadcasting Company, during which the Reverend Billy
James Hargis claimed the author of a book critical of United Staes Senator Barry
Goldwater (R-Ariz.) had been fired from his job for making false charges and had
worked for a Communist affiliated publication. Id. at 371. The author heard of the
broadcast and demanded free "reply time" on the grounds that he had been "per-
sonally attacked" on the broadcast. Id. at 371-372.
166. At Farleigh Dickenson University, Teaneck, New Jersey, on November 6,
1974, Remarks of William 0. Douglas, 26 HASTINGS I.J. 819 (1975).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 821.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1962, § 1, at 10, col. 6.
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jury. The Court thus invites state and federal authorities to undermine
the historic independence of the press by attempting to annex the journal-
istic profession as an investigative arm of government. Not only will this
decision impair performance of the press' constitutionally protected func-
tions, but it will, I am convinced, in the long run harm, rather than help
administration of justice. 1 7 2
Stewart further commented on newsman's privilege in an address
at Yale Law School.iV3 He took issue with the idea, promoted by
White in Branzburg, that the question of a reporter's right to con-
ceal sources was simply a freedom of speech issue which did not
stand in the face of the obligation to testify before a grand jury.'7 4
"None of us - as individuals - has a 'free speech' right," he said,
"to refuse to tell a grand jury" the identity of an informant who
divulged relevant information. 7 5 "Only if a reporter is a repre-
sentative of a protected institution176 does the question become a
different one."'177
White's approach has been to declare the press to be a pro-
tected institution even as he writes an opinion that may not settle
well with much of the media.' 78 A similar approach was taken
and explained in revealing fashion in an address to the American
Society of Newspaper Editors 79 by Chief Justice Warren Burger,
who has sided with White in all but two of the opinions discussed
in- this comment, Time, Inc. v. Firestone'8 0 and Herbert v.
Lando.'8 ' The Chief Justice stated:
I am sure you would agree that a strong and independent judiciary is
imperative to a free society, but there is a tendency to take it for granted.
172. 408 U.S. at 725 (dissenting opinion; Stewart, J.).
173. Yale Law School Sesquicentennial Convocation, New Haven, Connecticut,
on November 2, 1974. 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975). See also note 1 supra.
174. Stewart, J., supra note 1, at 635.
In the cases involving the newspaper reporters' claims that they have a
constitutional privilege not to disclose their confidential news sources to a
grand jury, the Court rejected the claims by a vote of five to four, or, con-
sidering Mr. Justice Powell's concurring opinion, perhaps by a vote of four
and a half to four and a half. But if freedom of the press means simply
freedom of speech for reporters, this question of a reporter's asserted
right to withhold information would have answered itself.
Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. (emphasis added). Assumedly Stewart is referring here to "the press"
as individuals, since the topic of his speech is the press as a protected institution.
Id.
177. Id.
178. See generally notes 158-162 supra, and accompanying text.
179. Delivered in Washington, D.C., on April 18, 1975. 63 GEo. L.J. 1195 (1975).
180. 424 U.S. 448 (1976). See note 116 supra.
181. 99 S. Ct. 1635 (1979).
It is easy to take things for granted when we have had them for a long
time. Yet, based on what I hear and read, I doubt that journalists take the
First Amendment of the Constitution and press freedom for granted. That
is only natural, because the press freedoms, for journalists, are the shoes
you wear every day - and when they pinch you feel it quickly. I hope
you will not consider me an unmannerly guest, if I say that some journal-
ists occasionally react to criticism of the media as though the First
Amendment rights of the critics had in some way become second class.
But it is good that journalists react quickly on press freedom. If you and
your predecessors had not been alert, we probably would not have all the
great freedoms we cherish.
18 2
However, the Chief Justice goes on to state that he is
well aware that there is a strong view among at least some journalists that
when conflicts arise between claims of the press and interests of others -
for example, in areas of privacy or enforcement of criminal law - the de-
cision should always go in favor of the press. 1 8 3 But courts must balance
conflicting claims and few rights are absolute ..... Those few who think
that the press must have unrestrained, unreviewable power sometimes
tend to view the Court as 'enemies.' Nothing could be further from a real-
istic appraisal of how press freedom has evolved in our country. 18 4
It is this evolutionary process which is of great concern to
White. This process has been shown to preoccupy his writing,
which frequently includes a reference to the Founding Fathers or
common law principles. 185 Lance Liebman, a former law clerk of
White's,186 writes that Justice White is not only concerned with
reaching desirable results, but that the process of reaching the re-
sult itself will be desirable. This same concern was shown by
White while deputy attorney general.187
Liebman further states that White differs with others when he
has a concern about the effectiveness of the Court over time,188
recalling the argument expressed several times that if more privi-
182. 63 GEO. L.J. 1195 (1975).
183. See discussion in opposition to White's views, note 8 supra, and the views
of the late Justice Douglas, notes 162, 164, 168-170 supra, and accompanying text.
184. 63 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1196. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 381-
383, regarding the absence of any favor by the founding fathers for an absolute and
privileged status for the press or Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 681-682, which
lists traditional first amendment protections as being against intrusion upon
speech or assembly, prior restraint, commanding publication, and exaction of a tax
for the privilege of publishing, among others.
185. N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1972, (Magazine), at 16.
186. Id. at 95, col. 3. "He is also a democrat, preferring legislative-political-
settlement for its own sake; not just because it may reach a desirable result but
because the process of reaching the result will be itself desirable." Id.
187. See notes 21 and 23 supra, and accompanying text for a discussion of
White's preference for a procedural approach to legal analysis.
188. N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1972, (Magazine), at 98.
But it certainly seems clear that Justice White's differences with the War-
ren majority were not over whether the Court should play this role[,] but
over their political judgements-he differed over timing, public acceptance
and the effectiveness of the Court over time, and differed as well over the
basic question of whether a reform was desirable.
Id.
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lege is given to the press now, there would be an uncontrollable
situation in the future.
In the area of free speech, Liebman states "[f or White, the
starting point is personal, professional and institutional responsi-
bility."'189 While White as an individual might choose a more ac-
tive and less orderly-"role in the process of social change,"190
White as a Supreme Court Justice is "part of the present scheme
for resolving public controversies, and he will not be an instru-
ment by which that scheme is employed to justify attempts to
overthrow it."''9 1 Thus, White would not let refusal to divulge
sources or refusal to submit material from newsroom fies, no
matter how moral, go unchecked because he believes he is
charged with a greater responsibility to insure the orderly work-
ing of traditional modes of prosecution.
VIII. CONCLUSION
White's philosophy of legal thinking has required him to adhere
to principles grounded in the common law. In the context of free-
dom of the press and the first amendment, White has chosen to
view common law principles as restricting the first amendment to
a protection of political criticism and from prior restraint. 92 Ad-
ditionally, his adherence to a non-activist stance causes him to
view the traditional modes of prosecution, such as subpoenas of
persons and materials and the obligation to testify, as always be-
ing the proper modes of providing justice. Accordingly, this does
not allow for the creation of a privileged class or industry as some
might wish to classify newsmen or the press. 193 To allow such a
creation would require White to concede that the subpoena, the
grand jury and other prosecutorial weapons are not always the
best means of assuring that justice is done.194 White then has
placed his faith in the legal system through a traditional, nonac-
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 99.
192. See note 184 supra. See generally notes 52-69 supra, and accompanying
text for a discussion of colonial law.
193. See notes 70-87 supra, and accompanying text for a discussion of news-
man's privilege.
194. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), where White classifies
the operation of the grand jury as a "fundamental function of government," while
characterizing a corresponding burden on the press to be "consequential, but un-
certain." Id. at 690.
tivist manner. In acting as an attorney and as a judge, it appears
that he has adopted legalism as a way of life. Witness the insis-
tence on proper procedure as observed by colleagues at the Jus-
tice Department and the Supreme Court and his admitted desire
to distinguish between a personal moral call and the obligations
of a Supreme Court Justice.195 The result is that White appar-
ently chooses not to merge personal ideas with his professional
faith of legalism. 96
The effect of White's stance regarding the press is still uncer-
tain; Chief Justice Burger's claim that the press has given an un-
realistic appraisal of the Court's first amendment
interpretations197 remains unanswered until future situations test
the scope of decisions such as those authored by White. Both
those who praise and fear White's opinions believe they are voic-
ing the concerns of the so-called "public interest."198 White re-
marks in his Gertz dissent that when the public interest is not
being furthered, the search for truth may be frustrated.199 The
question then is whether the public interest is frustrated when
the traditional prosecutorial methods are not being furthered, or
when the privileges sought by the press are not being fur-
thered.200
Because the above two interests have been shown to clash,
195. See notes 21, 23 and 189 supra, and accompanying text.
196. An exception to this choice is when White's sense of morals and sense of
justice are the same, as evidenced from this statement: "the crimes of news
sources are no less reprehensible and threatening to the public interest when wit-
nessed by a reporter than when they are not," Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 692,
and this statement:
[ W ] e cannot accept the argument that the public interest in possible fu-
ture news about crime from undisclosed, unverified sources must take
precedence over the public interest in pursuing and prosecuting those
crimes reported to the press by informants and in thus deterring the com-
mission of such crimes in the future.
Id. at 695.
197. See note 184 supra.
198. White concedes there is an interest in the burden placed upon the press,
but states that the extent of an impact is unclear and insignificant. 408 U.S. at 690,
693. See also note 101 supra.
199. 418 U.S. at 392.
It is difficult for me to understand why the ordinary citizen should himself
carry the risk of damage and suffer the injury in order to vindicate First
Amendment values by protecting the press and others from liability for
circulating false information. This is particularly true because such state-
ments serve no purpose whatsoever in furthering the public interest or the
search for truth but, on the contrary, may frustrate that search and at the
same time inflict great injury on the defenseless individual. The owners of
the press and the stockholders of the communications enterprises can
much better bear the burden. And if they cannot, the public at large
should somehow pay for what is essentially a public benefit derived at pri-
vate expense.
Id. (emphasis added).
200. Justice White, in striking the balance, makes his choice for the public in-
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White is correct in his belief that the public interest and the inter-
ests of the press are not always synonymous. Historically, the in-
terest in promoting a free press has been designated the most
paramount of all American rights. Nevertheless, by insisting
upon divorcing personal views from judicial decision making,
White has chosen to restrict the meaning of the freedom of the
press to only those areas in which specific protection was dele-
gated by the common law. Based upon the fact that he often
speaks for the majority of today's Court when the first amend-
ment is at issue, 20 1 White's opinions can be viewed as a barome-
ter for the immediate future of the freedom of the press.
MICHAEL J. ARMSTRONG
terest in ensuring proper prosecution occurs, as set forth in Branzburg. 408 U.S. at
695. See note 198 supra.
201. Chief Justice Burger and Associate Justices Blackmun, Powell and Rehn-
quist have joined with majority opinion author White in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665 (1972); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978). In Herbert v. Lando,
99 S. Ct. 1635 (1979), the above Justices joined White, except Justice Powell who
filed a concurring opinion to Justice White's majority opinion.

